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NOTES
DEMAND ON DIRECTORS IN A SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE SUIT WHEN THE BOARD HAS
APPROVED THE WRONG
Courts have long required a shareholder to exhaust all remedies available to him
within the corporation before he may independently maintain a shareholder derivative
suit.' To fulfill this requirement, the shareholder-plaintiff must make a demand on the
board of directors that they bring the action. 2 In most jurisdictions a board's decision not
to bring the derivative suit prevents the shareholder from continuing his suit. 3 The
board's decision, moreover, is protected from judicial scrutiny by the business judgment
rule.' By making a demand on the directors, therefore, the shareholder risks termination
of his suit. 5
Despite the general policy of the business judgment rule, courts have recognized that
the interests of the directors will sometimes unfairly predispose the board against the
derivative action. 6 When the board is unlikely to consider the shareholder's demand in
good faith, courts have generally held that demand would be futile and need not be
made.' Although the decision whether to waive the demand requirement is left to the trial
The common-law rule in the United States is at least as old as Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104
U.S. 450, 455 (1882), and is found in England as early as Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 490-91, 67
Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (Ch. 1843). This demand requirement is embodied in statutory law as FED. R.
Civ, P. 23.1 and similar state provisions such as N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 626(c) (McKinney 1963) and
DEL. CODE ANN., CH. Cr. R. 23.1 (1981). Most jurisdictions have enacted provisions nearly identical
to FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, which states in part: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or a
comparable authority ... and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort."
The unusual legal status of shareholder derivative suits is discussed infra notes 17-22 and
accompanying text.
• To exhaust all intra-corporate remedies available the shareholder may also be required to
make a similar demand on the other shareholders. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. This note, however, will
discuss only demand on directors.
• See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
4 Following the business judgment doctrine, a court will not interpose its judgment for a good
faith business decision made by a director in the course of his corporate duties. See infra notes 32-36
and accompanying text.
• A shareholder who wants to proceed with his derivative suit after his demand has been
rejected must bring a separate suit claiming that the board had not considered his demand in good
faith. See,e.g., Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 783 (Del. 1981).
• See generally Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73
HARV. L. REV. 746, 753-54 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]; see also infra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text.
7 See Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1980).
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court's discretion," the courts have universally agreed that certain circumstances, such as
when the alleged wrongdoers constitute a majority of the board, warrant a presumption
that demand would be futile."
Courts have disagreed, however, about whether demand is presumptively futile
when the board 'has approved or acquiesced to the alleged wrong that forms the cause of
action.'° A majority of courts have held that the plaintiff must allege a greater involve-
ment in the wrong by the directors before a court may presume that the board would not
consider the demand in good faith." Other courts have criticized the majority position as
requiring too much of the plaintiff" and as presenting an unrealistic view of how a board
of directors can be expected to act toward a shareholder's demand.' 3
 These minority
courts have ruled that the plaintiff's allegations that the board had approved or ac-
quiesced to the alleged wrong is sufficient to warrant waiving the demand requirement."
Despite the division of opinion in the courts and the frequent litigation of the issue of
the futility of demand in the face of board approval of the wrongful corporate act,'' the
issue has received only a cursory treatment in legal literature.]° This note will critically
examine the majority position which holds that the shareholder-plaintiff should be
required to make a demand in this situation. It will be shown that the majority position,
grounded as it is in an overly optimistic assessment of the independence of corporate
directors and an overly pessimistic view of the ability of corporations to defend themselves
against meritless suits, places an unreasonable burden on the derivative plaintiff and
should therefore give way to a rule waiving the demand requirement when the board has
approved or acquiesced to the challenged wrong. The first part of this note will elaborate
on the general application of the demand requirement and its futility exception. In the
second part of this note the majority position will be presented. The third part of the note
will evaluate the premises underlying the majority position and demonstrate that those
premises fail to address the legal and practical realities of shareholder litigation. The note
concludes that demand on the board of directors is futile in these cases and should be
waived.
" See Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Affiliated
Funds, Inc. v. Papilsky, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 747.
" See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
'° See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); infra text
accompanying notes 179-209.
See, e.g., Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 380-81, 329 N.E.2d 180, 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497,
507 (1975); infra text accompanying notes 114-176.
14
 See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97, cert. denied sub nom. Affiliated Funds, Inc. v.
Papilsky, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
In addition to the cases cited infra notes 55 and 57, the futility of demand issue is also dicussed
in, for example, Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1980); Nussbacher
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276, 284-85
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
See, e.g., Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Shareholder Derivative Actions, 44 U.
Cm. L. REV. 168, 175-80 (1976) (concluding, with little discussion, that there are compelling reasons
for requiring demand when the only allegation of futility is that the directors acquiesced to the
wrong) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Note]. But see Note, Demand upon Directors in a Shareholder's
Derivative Suit Under Rule 23.1,8 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 287 (1974) (article devoted entirely to this issue).
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1. THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT
In a shareholder derivative suit a shareholder brings a legal action to enforce a claim
that the management group in control of the corporation has failed to enforce,' 7 Al-
though the corporate claim asserted by the shareholder arises from harm done to the
corporation,'s the plaintiff in a derivative action also names the corporation as a defen-
dant for refusing to bring suit to protect the corporate interest's The essence of a
derivative suit is, nevertheless, that the cause of action belongs to the corporation rather
than to the shareholder.'° The corporation, furthermore, must refuse to bring the claim
before the shareholder may proceed with the derivative suit.' Consequently, courts
require the shareholder to afford the corporation with an opportunity either to assume
control of the action or reject it."
To give the corporation an opportunity to assume control, the shareholder, before
filing his suit, must make a demand on the board of directors that they institute an action
on the corporation's behalf.-' If the directors decide to proceed with the suit, the corpora-
tion takes control of the litigation from the shareholder:m If, however, the directors
refuse to bring the suit, the shareholder may be precluded from continuing with his claim
unless he can show that the board's decision was made in had faith. 25
By allowing the board to assume control of the litigation, the demand requirement
not only reflects the corporate nature of the cause of action, but serves five practical
purposes as well.'s First, the demand alerts the board of directors to the existence of the
potential lawsuit and allows the directors to pursue means to avoid litigation that may not
be available to the shareholder." Second, demand allows the directors, whose knowledge
of the transactions involved in the suit and whose access to pertinent information is
greater than the shareholder's, to assess the merits of the case and terminate meritless
IT Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970).
18 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE. LAW OF CORPORATIONS 755 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
HENN]. The harm may be committed by parties inside or outside the corporation. A shareholder's
ability to institute an action to redress wrongs committed by corporate insiders makes the derivative
suit an especially important remedy for minority shareholders seeking to call upon directors or
controlling shareholders to account for mismanagement and fraudulent dealings. 13 W. FLETCHER,
ENCYLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE. CORPORATIONS § 5941.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as FLETCHER).
' 9 HENN, supra note 18, at 750.
2° Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1970). Although in most cases the distinction is
obvious, in some cases it may be difficult to decide if the shareholder is bringing suit based on harm
to the corporation or to himself. See generally Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative
Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1962) (advocating a result-oriented approach to decide
hard cases).
21 As stated by the Supreme Court, "one precondition for the suit was a valid claim on which the
corporation could have sued; another was that the corporation itself had refused to proceed after
suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534
(1970).
22 See Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 748.
" Chicago Note,supra note 16, at 169. The board of directors has the primary responsibility for
enforcing corporate rights. FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 5963.
" See Chicago Note, supra note 16, at 171.
25 Id. at 169. See also infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
26 See Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 748-49.
27 Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
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suits.' Third, the board's ability to terminate shareholder's actions after demand has been
made allows the corporation to defend itself against "strike suits" — meridess suits
brought in the hope of settlement and large fees for the plaintiff's attorney.' 9 Fourth, the
corporation, with its superior financial resources and greater access to information, is able
to pursue the action more effectively than the shareholder if the directors decide to take
control of the suit after having been served with a demand. 3° Finally, the demand
requirement also permits the board to terminate a suit that, while merited, would ad-
versely affect an ongoing business relationship to the extent that the harm to the corpora-
tion would outweigh the gains."
A board's good faith decision to reject a shareholder's demand is protected from
judicial scrutiny under the business judgment cloctrine. 32 This doctrine developed from a
desire to protect directors from liability to the corporation arising from errors made
through.
 a good faith exercise of their discretion." The protection of the doctrine rests
upon the assumption that the directors must be given wide latitude in making decisions to
manage the corporation properly and efficiently. 34 Accordingly, when a director makes a
decision in the course of his corporate duties that he believes, erroneously but in good
faith, to be in the best interests of the corporation, a court will not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the director or hold the director liable for any loss resulting from the
honest mistake." With respect to shareholder derivative suits, courts will not question the
directors' good faith belief that pursuing the suit would not be in the best interests of the
corporalion. 3°
Courts disagree on the effect that the business judgment doctrine has on the share-
holder's right to continue with his derivative suit." A few courts have stated that the
shareholder is entitled to persist in his action in spite of the board's rejection of his
2 8 Id.
" Chicago Note, supra note 16, at 172. Indeed the possibility of strike suits has been viewed as
the primary impetus for restrictions placed on derivative suits. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 787
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); HENN, supra note 18, at 749. Nevertheless, it has been
suggested that the demand requirement is not needed to fulfill this function because strike suits no
longer pose a significant threat to the corporation. See HENN, supra note 18, at 791; Note, Security for
Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 CoLum. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 50, 65
(1968).
Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Brooks v. American Export Industries,
Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981). For
example, the corporation may have a cause of action against a customer but may wish to continue
doing business with him. In such a case the recovery from the suit may be less than the business lost as
a result. See Cramer, 582 F.2d at 275.
Cramer, 582 F.2d at 274. See generally Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit? , 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96, 98-105 (1980) (applying the rule to
derivative suits) [hereinafter cited as Dent]; Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards
of Directors, 96 H ARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983) (questioning the validity of judicial assumptions of board
impartiality); and Note, The Continuing Visibility of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial
Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1967) (recommending restraint in weakening the business
judgment rule).
" Cramer, 582 F.2d at 274; Dent, supra note 32, at 101.
Cramer, 582 F.2d at 274.
35 HENN, supra note 18, at 482.
" Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1979).
37 See Dent, supra note 32, at 100-03.
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demand. 38 A majority, however, has held that the board's rejection of the shareholder's
demand bars the shareholder from proceeding with his suit unless he can show that the
board's decision is not entitled to the protection of the business judgment doctrine." To
meet this burden, the shareholder must show that the board's decision was not made in
good faith.'"
All courts recognize, however, that in some cases the board's interests so conflict with
the interest of the shareholder that rejection of the demand is certain. In such cases courts
have held that the shareholder's demand would be "futile." 41 A trial court has consider-
able discretion in determining whether demand is futile in a particular case, and no
absolute rules can be found governing all situations."' Nevertheless, demand is generally
held to be futile in certain common, recurring situations. These situations include: when
the defendants constitute a majority of the board:" or control the board;''' or when a
majority of the board is self-interested in the transaction that forms the basis of the suit. 45
When a court determines that demand would be futile, it will waive the requirement and
permit the shareholder-plaintiff to proceed with his suit without making a demand." The
shareholder-plaintiff need not obtain a court ruling of futility before he initiates his suit
without making a demand. Generally he need only state in his complaint allegations
supporting his assertion that demand would have been futile. 47 A plaintiff does not,
however, avoid the demand requirement merely by alleging that. demand would be
futile." Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 23.1") and similar state
rules require a shareholder-plaintiff who is alleging that demand would be futile to state
"with particularity" the reasons for his allegation.'" The defendant corporation may file a
" See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (dictum), cert. denied sub
nom. Affiliated Fund, Inc, v. Papilsky, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
'" See Dent, supra note 32, at 102. See also United States Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917).
" Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 631, 3g3 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979). A showing of bad faith may
include a demonstration of collusion between directors and wrongdoers, breach of trust, or inexcus-
able neglect. See Dent, supra note 32, at 102.
4 ' Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 1980); see Chicago Note, supra
note 16, at 173-82 (discussing common situations in which courts have held demand to be futile).
' FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 5965.
" See Heft v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1st Cir. 1977). A plaintiff cannot escape demand,
however, merely by naming all the directors as defendants; he must be prepared to support his
allegation. Id.
" See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435
F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970) (defendants were two members of a five-man board who had
chosen the other three members).
-15
 See, e.g.,, Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 786-87 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (to
avoid a proxy battle the board of directors entered into a settlement agreement that used corporate
funds to buy out a corporate raider).
46 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE II 23.1.19 (2d ed. 1982).
" See FED. R. Cis'. P. 23.1.
" See In re Kauffman Mutual Fund, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
A plaintiff generally wants to avoid making a demand because the business judgment rule may bar
him from continuing with his suit after the board of directors has rejected his demand. See supra
notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
49
	 R. Civ. P. 23.1. See supra note 1 for text of rule. See also FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 5963,
(examples of similar state rules cited). When this note refers to Federal Rule 23.1 it also refers to
similar rules in state jurisdictions.
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motion challenging the plaintiff's failure to make the demand." The trial court rules on
the motion by deciding whether the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to support a
finding that demand would have been futile."
Courts have disagreed about whether the plaintiff's allegations that the hoard of
directors approved or acquiesced to the action challenged by the suit are sufficient to
justify a finding of futility. 52 The majority view is that a court should not presume that a
board of directors will refuse to correct a wrong merely because the board had approved
or acquiesced to the wrong in the first instance. 53 Unless the plaintiff can allege that the
directors were self-interested in the alleged wrong or had participated in it to a degree
greater than simple approval, the majority of courts have found that demand on the
directors would not have been futile." Other courts, however, have waived the demand
requirement, ruling that the board's approval of the alleged harmful transaction is
sufficient involvement in the harm to render demand useless. 55
Both the majority and minority positions have been criticized as giving one party an
unfair advantage over the other. Critics of the majority position have denied that Rule
23.1 requires allegations of director involvement to support a finding of futility. 56
 They
assert that courts should be lenient in excusing the demand requirement. 57 In contrast,
critics of the minority position have contended that excusing demand whenever the
plaintiff can allege that the directors approved or acquiesced to the alleged wrong would
entail excusing demand in so many cases that the demand requirement would lose its
value as a protection for the corporation against harmful suits." The following sections of
this note will examine the majority position and minority criticism of it in greater detail."
The next section will present the majority position and its rationale for imposing the
demand requirement. That rationale will be evaluated in the third part of the article. 60
II. THE MAJORITY POSITION
Most courts have taken the position that board approval of the alleged wrong that
forms the basis of the shareholder derivative suit is not by itself sufficient to render the
shareholder's demand on the board futile. 6 ' In reaching this decision, these courts have
" This motion takes the form of a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23.1. See Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus-
tries, Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1978); Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 261-62.
5 ' See Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1978); Kauffman,
479 F.2d at 263.
52
 Chicago Note, supra note 16, at 175. Approval or acquiescence by the directors includes
directors having knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing and failing to stop it. Cohen v. Industrial Fin.
Corp., 44 E. Stipp. 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
53 See, e.g. , Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1 162
(1st Cir. 1977); Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 264.
" See Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 265.
" See, e.g., Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Papilsky v. Berndt,
59 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Affiliated Funds v. Papilsky, 419 U.S. 1048
(1974).
" See, e.g., Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
57 See 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE ¶ 23.1.19 (2d ed. 1982).
" Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 265.
50 See infra text accompanying notes 61 to 242.
" See infra text accompanying notes 61 to 112.
"' See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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refused to presume that the board would have treated the demand in had faith unless the
plaintiff can show that a majority of the directors were self-interested in the wrongful
transaction." Some majority courts have also viewed Rule 23.1 as requiring a greater
degree of specificity than other rules of pleading and have therefore placed an extra
pleading burden on the shareholder-plaintiff who alleges futility, 6° Finally, some of these
courts have expressed concern that waiver of the demand requirement in all board.
approval situations would unduly weaken corporations' ability to protect themselves from
harmful shareholder suits."
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit clearly articulated
the majority position in deciding In re Kauffman Mutual Fund.' In Kauffman, a share-
holder in four mutual funds brought a derivative suit against the directors of the funds
and the trade association of the mutual fund industry" alleging that the defendants had
violated antitrust laws by conspiring to set excessive management fees. 67 The plaintiff
initiated his action without making a demand on the board of directors, asserting that
demand would be futile because, inter alia, "[a]ll of the defendants ... have acquiesced,
encouraged, cooperated and assisted in the effectuation and maintenance of the ..
conspiracy." 68 The First Circuit rejected the plaintiff's futility claim and affirmed the
decision of the district court dismissing the suit for failure to make a demand in com-
pliance with Rule 23.1." In rejecting the allegations of futility the court employed a
three-part analysis. First, the court discussed how directors can be -expected to act when
confronted with a shareholder demand to bring a derivative suit." Second, it examined
the procedural requirements of Rule 23.1 and the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allega-
tions." Third, the court analyzed the effect that waiver would have on the efficacy of Rule
23.1 as a defense against meritless suits."
In the first part of its analysis the First Circuit refused to accept the plaintiff's
assumption that the board of directors would necessarily oppose the demand simply
because they had originally approved the disputed management fees." Instead, the court
stated that any assumption about what the board would do should be based on the nature
of the particular wrongdoing alleged in the case at hand." The court also distinguished
between transactions that can only be viewed as unrelated to any legitimate corporate
purpose and those transactions that can be viewed as serving the interests of the corpora-
" See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d
115, 124 (1st Cir.), cm. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (1st Cir.
1977).
6' See, e.g, , Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1160
(1st Cir. 1977).
" See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 265.
65 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
66 Id. at 261.
67 Id.
" Id. at 263 n.2 (quoting from the complaint).
" Id. at 267.
" Id. at 265.
71 Id. at 263-67.
72 Id. at 265.
" Id. There was some question whether the composition of the board at the time of the suit was
the same as when the management lees were approved. The court stated, however, that "[e]ven if we
could assume that there had never been a change in the complement of the boards of directors . . . it
would not follow that mere prior participation would excuse making the demand." Id.
7'
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tion." If the disputed transaction benefits a minority of the board with no apparent
benefit to the corporation, the Kauffman court concluded that the approval of the transac-
tion by the rest of the board will be suspect even though the majority did not themselves
benefit." In such a case, the court said, the approval of the "disinterested" directors is
"prima facie inexplicable"" and a court may assume that the "disinterested" directors are
controlled by the directors who benefited." The court further noted that it would assume
that the controlled directors would remain under the wrorlgdoers' control when the
board votes on the plaintiff's demand." When the board has approved a transaction that
is related to a legitimate corporate purpose, however, the First Circuit asserted that it
would not assume that the board of directors would be antagonistic to the demand merely
because some of the directors benefited." Although conceding that such transactions may
be criticized as representing poor business judgment, the court noted that they do not
compel an assumption of wrongdoing as a transaction unrelated to a corporate purpose
would."' Accordingly, where the directors have merely made a possible error in judg-
ment, and a shareholder makes a demand that they bring a suit to correct the harm, the
Kauffman court saw no justification for assuming that a director would "refuse to do [his]
duty on behalf of the corporation if [he] were asked to do so." 82
 The First Circuit
concluded that to demonstrate futility the plaintiff who is challenging a transaction
facially related to a legitimate corporate purpose must show some self-interest or bias on
the part of a majority of the directors supporting the assumption that the board will not
treat his demand in good faith."
In the case before it, the Kauffman court observed that the transaction being chal-
lenged, the compensation of investment managers, was obviously related to a corporate
purpose and was therefore not presumptively improper." Consequently, it refused to
assume that the directors would have acted on the shareholder demand in bad faith
unless the plaintiff could allege that a majority of the board had an interest in the
compensation decision or had been biased against the suit." Although the plaintiff had
alleged that some of the directors had been self-interested in the compensation decision,
he had not alleged any self-interest or bias on the part of a majority of the directors." The
First Circuit therefore rejected the plaintiff's claims of futility, stating, "[w]here mere
approval of the corporate actions, absent self-interest or other indication of bias, is the
sole basis for establishing the directors' `wrongdoing' and hence for excusing demand on
them, plaintiff's suit should ordinarily be dismissed." 87
In the second part of its analysis, the Kauffman court supported its decision by













" Id. at 262.
" Id. at 265.
" Id. at 263.
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the rule should not be regarded in the context of the liberal requirements of notice
pleading embodied by the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Instead, the
court viewed Rule 23.1 as fulfilling a purpose different from notice and requiring a
different judicial approach." The First Circuit noted that by instigating a suit without
making a demand, a plaintiff is trying to put hithself in a position that rightfully belongs
to the board." Before a plaintiff is allowed to usurp the board's function by controlling
the suit, the court reasoned, the rule requires him to show that his case is "exceptional.""
In addition to the usual requirements of pleading a cause of action, the Kauffman court
concluded that the derivative plaintiff' must also establish that he has a right to bring the
action." A plaintiff accomplishes this, the court stated, by showing that the board is
incapable of doing its duty or that an inherent antagonism exists between the interests of
the board and the interests of the corporation.'" The First Circuit also asserted that. Rule
23.1 mandates that the plaintiff plead in detail." Unlike the "notice" tenor of Rule 8,
which requires only a "short and plain statement" .of what is to he plead, 96 the court
observed, Rule 23.1 requires that the complaint "allege with particularity" the reasons for
not making the demand. 97 The Kauffman court interpreted this clause to mean that courts
should require a higher degree of specificity from pleadings that fall under Rule 211."
Accordingly, the court concluded that the derivative plaintiff must plead facts that
demonstrate that his demand would have been futile." He may not, according to the
Kauffman court, make merely conclusory statements or plead in general terms hoping that
later he may be able to substantiate his claims.'"
Finally, the First Circuit in Kauffman also expressed its concern that the effectiveness
of Rule 23.1 as a legitimate corporate defense against harmful shareholder suits would be
seriously attenuated by excusing demand whenever the board had approved the chal-
lenged transaction.'°' It noted that most derivative suits arise from an allegedly harmful
transaction that has been sanctioned or approved by the board of directors.'° 2 The court
worried that if the demand requirement were waived in these cases, few instances would
be left to which the demand requirement applied.' 03 Furthermore, if the demand were
excused because the directors had approved or acquiesced to the alleged wrong, the First
" Id. To the extent that the discussion contrasts Federal "notice" pleading with Rule 23.1, see ,
infra text accompanying notes 95-100, it does not apply to similar state rules. Similar questions
concerning the degree of specificity mandated by the demand requirement occur, nevertheless, in
state courts as well. See, e.g., Barr y. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186, 386 N.Y.S.
497, 506 (1975).
9° Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263.
91 Id.
82 Id.
" Id. The Kauffman court quoted Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 538, 109
N.E. 452, 456 (1915), which stated, lilt is not a technical rule of pleading, but one of substantive
right." Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263.
" Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263.
85 Id.
" Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
" Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
" Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263.
°' Id.
'°° Id.
un Id. at 265.
' 9' Id.
'° Id.
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Circuit was concerned that demand could then be excused whenever the directors merely
failed to oppose the wrong or later failed to bring suit to correct it. (04 The Kauffman court
hypothesized that a plaintiff could then avoid the demand requirement simply by alleging
that a wrong had been committed and no action had been taken to right it.'" In this way,
the court deduced, the shareholder would be entitled to show that he had a right to
maintain a derivative action solely be alleging that a wrong had been committed.'" The
result, the Kauffman court concluded, would be that Rule 23.1 would become "virtually
meaningless."' Applying this analysis to the pleading before it, the court held that the
plaintiff in Kauffman, by alleging only director approval of the management fees without
self-interest, had not met his burden of particularity under Rule 23.1. 108
The Kauffman decision represents the majority position.'" When a plaintiff's only
allegation to support his claim that demand on the board of directors would be futile is
that the board had approved of the alleged wrong, the majority position views this
allegation as insufficient to waive the demand requirement. The holdings of the majority
courts are generally grounded on the three premises found in the Kauffman analysis.
First, courts will not assume, under the majority view, that the board would have treated
t he shareholder demand in bad faith unless the plaintiff has shown that a majority of the
directors were self-interested in the challenged transaction."° Second, courts adopting
the majority position regard Rule 23.1 as an "extraordinary rule" requiring the plaintiff
to demonstrate futility with a greater degree of specificity than is required by common
notice pleading."' Third, the demand requirement must be maintained in board ap-
proval cases, according to the majority view, to protect corporations from harmful,
merittess shareholder suits."' Although accepted by a majority of courts, these premises
do not withstand close scrutiny. The next section of the note will present the reasoning of
courts that have rejected the majority view and evaluate the majority's premises in light of
the realities of corporate management and shareholder litigation.
111. CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY POSITION
Neither the holding nor the reasoning of Kauffman has been universally accepted.
Some courts have held that the shareholder's allegations that the directors had approved
the corporate action challenged in the derivative suit is sufficient to support a finding that
demand would have been futile." 3
 These courts and other critics, moreover, have ques-






'" Id. at 266.
"'" See Chicago Note, supra note 16, at 176-77.
"° See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d
115, 124 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (1st Cir.
1977).
'" See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157,
1160 (1st Cir. 1977),
" 2. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); see also, Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,
786-87 (Del. 1981).
'" See, e.g., Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Barr v. Wackman,
36 N.Y.2d 371, 381, 329 N.E.2d 180, 188, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 507-08 (1975).
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majority position. Specifically, they are skeptical about the validity of the assumption that
disinterested directors will act in good faith toward a shareholder demand; a skepticism
supported by studies of corporate boards indicating that they are unlikely to be sympathe-
tic toward shareholder derivative suits. The critics also object to the obstacles placed in the
path of the derivative plaintiff by the majority view that Rule 23.1 is an "extraordinary
rule." Both state and federal procedural rules provide corporations with ample protection
against strike suits without resort to the demand requirement.
A. Good Faith and the Disinterested Director
The minority courts, which have waived the demand requirement when the board
has approved the challenged transaction, have viewed boards of directors very differently
from the majority. Generally, courts espousing the minority position have regarded as
unrealistic the majority's presumption that the directors who had previously approved of
a transaction would later vote to bring a suit against themselves or other directors for their
involvement in the challenged transaction." 4 One court has observed that, "it would be
the height of folly to entrust the conduct of the litigation, either directly or indirectly, to
the very same people who are responsible for the wrongs."""
Other courts have expressed similar reservations: In Bar7'7.1. Wackinan,"4 for example,
the court concluded that demand would be futile because the directors' potential liability
for lack of due care would prejudice them against the shareholder suit even if they were
not personally involved in the wrongdoing. In Barr, a shareholder of Talcott National
Corporation commenced a derivative suit against Talcott and its board of directors.w
According to the complaint, Talcott had conducted merger negotiations with Gulf &
Western Industries that resulted in a merger "agreement in principle" whereby Gulf &
Western would purchase Talcott stock at $24.00 per share."" After this agreement had
been reached, three of the Talcott directors ("the interested directors") allegedly entered
into a plan with Gulf & Western to help Gulf & Western acquire Talcott on terms that
were much less favorable to Talcott and its shareholders." 9 ln return, the three interested
directors were to receive certain pecuniary benefits including future employment con-
tracts with a Gulf & Western subsidiary.'" The favorable merger agreement was then
allegedly replaced with a tender offer in which a Gulf & Western subsidiary would buy
Talcott stock at $20.00 per share.' The Talcott board of directors, the majority of which
were disinterested, approved the tender offer and recommended it to the Talcott share-
holders.'" The plaintiff brought suit seeking a judgment, requiring the interested direc-
tors to account for the profits they gained by their acts and damages sustained by
Talcott. "3
1 " See Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Nussbacher v. Chase
Manhattan Bank (N.A.), 444 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); James v. Microwave Cornmuncia-
don, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
15 Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
'" 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
1A7 Id. at 375, 329 N.E.2d at 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
118 Id.
"9 Id.
1" Id. at 375-76, 329 N.E.2d at 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03.
121 Id. at 375, 329 N.E.2d at 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
122. Id.
23
 Id. at 377, 329 N.E.2d at 185, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
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The shareholder-plaintiff commenced his derivative action without making a de-
mand on the Talcott board of directors.''' He alleged that a demand would have been
futile because "the board of directors participated in, authorized and approved the
challenged acts and its members are themselves subject to liability and, therefore, cannot
he expected to sue themselves.' Three of the defendants moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on the grounds that the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to justify excusing
the demand requirement; the trial court denied the motion, the Appellate Division
affirmed, and the defendants appealed.' 35 The New York Court of Appeals agreed with
the reasoning of the lower courts, holding that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to
withstand the defendants' motion to dismiss.'"
In its ruling, the Barr court rejected the Kavfhnan proposition that a derivative
plaintiff must allege self-dealing by a majority of the board as a prerequisite to a waiver of
demand.'"" It noted that directors have a duty of due care and diligence to the corpora-
tion that they do not fulfill merely by avoiding self-dealing.''' The court observed that
directors have an obligation to investigate any corporate act they approve to ensure that it
is not harmful to the corpo•ation.'" Had the disinterested directors investigated the
tender offer, the Barr court reasoned, they would have discovered the self-dealing of the
interested directors and prevented the damage to Talcott."' The court maintained that
the disinterested directors' failure to investigate made them vulnerable to liability for
these omissions even though they had not themselves profited."' In light. of the potential
liability of the directors, the Barr court concluded that the directors were unlikely to
prosecute the action.' 33 The New York Court of Appeals held, therefore, that the plain-
tiff's failure to make a demand on the hoard was warranted.' 34
Other courts have also questioned the propriety of leaving the decision of whether to
litigate to the board of directors. The decision in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co, 135 suggests
that directors may lack the independence needed to correct wrongs. In deHaus, the
plaintiffs had been shareholders in Inland Development Corporation, which had merged
with Empire.'" Prior to the merger Empire had owned a controlling interest in Inland
and the president. of Empire had also been the president and a director of Inland.'"
According to the plaintiffs, the president dominated and controlled both companies.'"
The plaintiffs further alleged that Inland had issued proxy statements designed to
Id. at 373, 329 N.E.2d at 182, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 500. The demand requirement is codified in
New York in section 626(c) of the Business Corporation Law, which is nearly identical to Rule 23.1. It
slates: "In any such action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the efforts of such action by
the board or the reasons for not making such efforts." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney
1963).
'2' Barr, 36 N.Y.2d at 373, 329 N.E.2d at 182, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
v=" Id. at 373, 329 N.E.2d at 182-83, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01.
1 " Id. at 381, 329 N.E.2d at 188, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
's" Id, at 380, 329 N.E.2d at 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
'"' Id.
la° Id. at 380, 329 N.E.2d at 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
'3' Id.
132 id,
 at 380, 329 N.E.2d at 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
133 Id. at 380, 329 N.E.2d at 187, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
' 3' Id.
' 3' 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), moded and aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
/d. at 811-12.
131 Id.
l" Id. at 812.
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mislead Inland shareholders into believing that Empire was financially sound and that the
merger would be advantageous when in fact Empire had two subsidiaries that were losing
money and apparently wanted Inland's assets to compensate. In After the merger Empire
continued to send encouraging letters to the shareholders."° The plaintiffs did not
become aware of the deception until three years later when Empire's board of directors
was compelled by a court order to send an annual report and financial statement to all .
shareholders. '" The plaintiffs commenced a derivative suit against Empire seeking dam-
ages for a violation of Rule 10(b):5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 142 They
made no demand on the board, alleging that such a demand would have been futile." 3
Although the majority of the directors had neither participated in nor profited from the
misleading proxies, 144 the plaintiffs contended that the board was so controlled by the
president that a demand would not have been acted upon in good faith. 143
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the control of the
board and waived the demand.'" After an examination of the directors' depositions, the
court concluded that it would have been "extremely unlikely" that the disinterested
directors would have taken meaningful action on the demand. 147 The depositions re-
vealed that the directors had been elected by the president and had taken little interest in
the corporation.'" Moreover, the directors had little knowledge of the corporation's
affairs or financial situation." 9 The trial court also found that the directors had at least
once acquiesced to the management. and approved a transaction that they were convinced
would fail.' 3° The deHaas court concluded that the directors lacked the independence
necessary to be "the kind of active and aggressive majority that would be likely to
undertake the difficult and demanding task of prosecuting a lawsuit for fraud against
those who elected them.""' Accordingly, the court held that to require a demand would
have been unrealistic.' 32
Similar conclusions regarding the behavior of boards of directors appear in other
sources as well. Business commentators have suggested that the lack of independence
found in deHaas is widespread among corporate directors. Professor Myles Mace, in his




'" Id. at 811.
'" Id. at 813.
144 The complaint alleged that Empire's president did profit from the merger by purchasing
stock options in one of the failing subsidiaries at the pre-merger price. Id. at 812.




4I Id. None of the directors had ever seen a financial statement of the corporation and one of
the directors was not aware that the corporation had public stockholders. Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
132 Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
trial court while modifying certain parts of the decision not related to the demand requirement. See
435 F.2d 1223, 1228.
M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as MACE]. Professor Mace
has updated his work, see Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality — Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293
(1979), but his conclusions remain essentially unchanged: "[M]y conversations with corporate direc-
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directors manages the corporation.'" To the contrary, he insists that the powers of
control in a normal, medium to large corporation belong exclusively to the manage-
ment.'" Professor Mace notes that the majority of directors on most boards are "outside"
directors — directors who are not full-time employees of the corporation.'" These
outside directors, Mace found, have full-time positions elsewhere and may sit on several
boards.'" Mace's study further reveals that the management looks to the board for advice
and expertise in making business decisions,'" but the decisions themselves are made by
the management and the board is expected to rubber stamp them.'" Although the
outside directors theoretically could oppose the management, Professor Mace found that
they rarely do.'"
Commentators offer several reasons to explain why the outside directors almost
always follow management. First, the outside directors tend to hold points of view similar
to those of management.'" They are chosen by the management and are often drawn
from the same clubs, civic associations, and colleges as the managing directors.'" Second,
many outside directors have very close business ties to the corporation.I 63 While none of
these reasons would absolutely prevent an outside director from challenging the man-
agement, such a challenge would be considered a breach of etiquette by the rest of the
board and the offender would be asked to resign.'" Even if an outside director is
independent enough to want to challenge the management, his ability to do so is severely
limited. 105 One limiting factor is that the directors are often involved with several boards
and cannot devote much time to any given company.'" Outside board members, more-
over, lack sufficient staff to mount a strong challenge against the management. i 67 Another
factor is that outside directors have no independent access to information. The informa-
tion they receive about the company is filtered through the management, which controls
its quality, quantity, and content. 16"
tors and CEO's and a reading of the literature has led me to the conclusion that boards of directors
operate pretty much as they did ten years ago." Id. at 297.





158 Id. at 13-22.
'" See id. at 15. The management consists of the officers of the corporation. Some, if not all, of
the officers usually serve as "inside" directors, i.e., those directors who are full-time employees of the
corporation. The management group generally constitutes only a minority of the board. See id. at
10-13.
'" Id. at 47.
111 See id. at 78; Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope — Faint
Promise?, 76 MICR L. REV. 581, 584 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Solomon]; Brudney, The Independent
Director — Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 Halm L. Rev. 597, 612 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Brudney]. See generally H EIDRICH & STR UGC LES, INC., PROFILE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (1971)
and Leach Sc Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Public Corporation, 31 Bus. Law. 1799 (1976).
' 62
 See MAcE,supra note 153, at 97.101; Solomon, supra note 161, at 584-85; Brudney,supra note
161, at 612-13.
See MACE, supra note 153, at 10-11; McAlmon, The Corporate Boardroom: A Closed Circle, Bus.
AND SOC'Y REV., Winter, 1974-75, at 65, 66 [hereinafter cited as McAlmon].
144 See MACE, supra note 153, at 80; Note, The Propriety ofJudicial Deference to Corporate Boards of
Directors, 96 I-faRv. L. REV. 1894, 1900 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Deference].
1 "" MACE, supra note 153, at 30. See Solomon, supra note 161, at 585; McAlmon, supra note 163,
at 66.
1116 See MACE, supra note 153, at 30.
'" See McAlmon, supra note 163, at 66.
Id. See also MACE, supra note 153, at 31; Solomon, supra note 161, at 585.
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As a result of the outside directors' cohesivenes with management and their lack of
independent information, they will usually vote with the management; which means that
they will usually vote against the derivative suit.'" Because most of what the board
approves is suggested by the management, rarely will a time arise when the directors
approve a corporate action not supported by the management. Accordingly, when a
shareholder challenges a corporate act that the board has approved or acquiesced to, his
demand will usually be refused by the outside directors.
Commenting on the position of inside directors, Professor George Dent, Jr. has
noted that they, as corporate employees, are even less able to oppose the management."
Dent has observed that, although they have greater access to information than outside
directors and more time to spend on corporate affairs, inside directors are even more
reliant on the management for their employment because their seats on the board are
their principal jobs'." Inside directors also rely on management for promotions and
salary increases, Dent has observed, neither of which is likely to be favorably affected by a
challenge to management's authority.' Dent therefore questions whether a director will
dispassionately consider a demand to bring a suit against his fellow board members.'"
Courts and commentators have thus expressed doubt regarding the validity of the
Kauffman court conclusion that, absent a showing of self-interest on the part of a majority
of directors, a court should assume that a board would act in good faith toward a
shareholder' demand. In Barr, the New York Court of Appeals noted that directors may
be liable for damages caused by a harmful transaction that they had approved.'" The
Barr court concluded that a director was not likely to vote to bring a suit that could expose
him to liability. L 73 Other sources indicate that directors, though disinterested, lack the
independence required to bring an action challenging a corporate action they had
approved or management had done at their acquiescence.'"
The second Kauffman premise stressed that Rule 23.1 is an extraordinary rule with
special requirements of particularity.'" Even if the proposition that the demand can be
futile when a majority of the board had not benefited from the challenged transaction is
accepted, Kauffman would still require the plaintiff to demonstrate, with specific allega-
tions, that the demand would, in fact, have been futile.'" The following section will
consider criticisms of this aspect of the majority position articulated in Kauffman.
B. The "Extraordinary Rule" Requirements of Particularity
Courts have disagreed about how much particularity the plaintiff's allegations of
futility must contain for a court to waive the demand requirement. The Kauffman court
stated that Rule 23.1 is an "extraordinary rule" that requires more specificity than
169 Brudney, supra note 161, at 620; Note, Judicial Deference, supra note 164, at 1906- 07.
1711 Dent, supra note 32, at 125.
171 Id. at Ill; see also Solomon, supra note 161, at 584.
171 Dent, supra note 32, at 111.
173 Id. at 110.
174 See supra notes 128- 31 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
176 See deHaas, 286 F. Supp. at 814; MACE, supra note 153, at 47; Solomon, supra note 161, at
584-85.
177 See Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263.
1711 Id.
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ordinary notice pleading.'" Accordingly, the First Circuit ruled that the derivative plain-
tiff must plead facts that demonstrate that the demand would have been futile.'" Allega-
tions that demand would have been futile because the directors had approved or ac-
quiesced to the alleged wrongs were not enough, the court held, to meet the requirements
of Rule 23.1. 191
While most courts have agreed with Kauffman,' 82 others have rejected the Kauffman
court's strict "extraordinary rule" requirements. In Liboff v. Wolfson , 1 s3 for example, the
plaintiff had initiated a shareholder derivative suit without making a demand on the
board of directors.'" The complaint alleged that a demand would have been futile
because the majority of the directors participated, approved of and acquiesced in the
challenged transaction.'" The plaintiff further alleged that the directors would not have
diligently prosecuted the suit because they would have had to bring an action against
themselves.'" The trial court dismissed the complaint. for failure io comply with Rule
23.1.' 87 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the
plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 23.1.'"
Although Rule 23.1 contains special pleading requirements, the Liboff court decided
that the general approach to rules of pleading is to minimize requirements of spec-
ificity.'"" In the instant case, the court noted, (he plaintiff had made an allegation of fact "°
to support. his claim that demand would •have been futile."' Under the language of Rule
23.1, the court held that the plaintiff had alleged "with particularity" the "reasons for his
failure" to make a demand."' Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiff's
allegations of hoard approval of the harm fully satisfied the requirements of the rule.'"
Similar leniency in waiving the demand requirement was shown in tonnes v. Mic-
rowave Communications, Inc. 194 The shareholder-plaintiff in jannes brought suit against the
members of the board of directors of Microwave Communications, Inc. ("MCI") for
damages sustained by the corporation due to alleged violations of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act. of 1934.' 11' The complaint alleged that two of the directors had
been the chief conspirators in misrepresentations involved in the sale of MCI stock to
insiders.•" The plaintiffs also alleged that demand on the board would have been futile
because the remaining directors, or some of them, had participated in the tnisrepresenta-
'7' See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
'8' Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 265.
in See supra note 111.
1" 437 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
184 Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122.
'" Id.
197 Id. at 121-22.
1€4j Id. at 122.
1 " Id.
'90 Id. The defendants conceded that the plaintiff's allegations were true insofar as they charac-
terized the board, without conceding the truth of' the conclusions that a wrong had been done or that




194 57 F.R.D. 18 (N.D. 111. 1972).
195
 Id. at 20.
' 98 Id. at 21.
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tions.' 97 The defendants brought a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule
23.1.' 9" In denying the motion to dismiss, theJannes Court noted that the decision of when
a waiver of demand is justified is within the "sound discretion" of the trial court.'" The
proper standard to be used on a motion to dismiss, the court stated, is "whether any set of
facts can be shown which would prove futility is applicable."" Upon the instant facts, the
trial court held that the plaintiffs' failure to make a demand was excused because the
plaintiffs had alleged facts which, if proved, would be sufficient to waive the demand
requirement."
Other critics have also advocated leniency in accepting the derivative plaintiff's
allegations of futility.' They have noted that shareholders have little independent access
to material information relating to the operations of the corporation."03 Lacking such
access, the plaintiff must often commence his suit with little information and may be
unable to meet strict pleading requirements early in the proceedings." Although the
fannes approach of generally accepting the plaintiff's allegations of futility as true may
seem susceptible to abuse, 205 it has been suggested that this is preferable to dismissing
meritorious suits, thereby negating important shareholder rights."'
The minority critics have, therefore, also rejected the strict pleading requirements of
the Kauffman "extraordinary rule" premise. The Liboff court, noting that modern notice
pleading tends to minimize requirements of specificity, ruled that Rule 23.1 only required
the plaintiff to make an allegation of fact that would support his claim of futility."'
Similarly, the fannes court stated that demand should be excused if any set of facts can be
shown to demonstrate futility." Other critics have suggested that leniency in waiving
demand may he more fair to the derivative plaintiff who usually has only limited access to
corporate information."9 The majority position also contends that the demand require-
ment is needed to protect corporations from meritless, harassing suits. In the next section
of the note, procedural devices which achieve the goal of protecting corporations without
intruding on a shareholder's ability to bring a good faith suit are discussed.
C. Procedural Defenses Against Meritless Suits
Adherents of the majority view have maintained that requiring demand in board
approval cases provides the corporation with a necessary defense against meritless suits."'
The lure of such suits for a shareholder-plaintiff is that the corporation, faced with the
197 See id.
1" Id. at 20.
' 99 Id. at 21.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Dent, supra note 32, at 142.
Dent, supra note 32, at 131. See also Gale' v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
2p4 Dent, supra note 32, at 131.
205 See Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 265.
206
 Dent, supra note 32, at 142.
207 Liboff, 437 F.2d at 122.
Jannes, 57 F.R.D. at 21.
299 See supra note 203.
210 See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Cramer v. General Telephone &
Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978); Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 265; Dent,supra note 32 at
137.
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prospect of an expensive and disruptive litigation,"" would rather settle privately with the
shareholder and his attorney than contest the allegations." According to the majority
view, these "strike suits," as they are called, 2 ' 3 would be controlled by requiring demand,
thus giving the board an opportunity to terminate them." 4 Nevertheless, the examination
of the operation of corporate boards presented previously in this note" shows that when
the board has approved of the challenged wrong, the demand requirement threatens
meritorious suits as well.
Procedural rules other than strict pleading requirements are available to serve this
defensive function as well as the demand requirement, without discouraging bona fide
shareholder suits. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restrict the ability of parties in
derivative actions to reach an improper settlement' and require the plaintiff and his
attorney to "verify" pleadings."" Another federal statute punishes attorneys for filing
frivolous pleadings," and states have erected procedural defenses as well. 219
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the "dismissal or com-
promise" of a shareholder derivative suit without the approval of the trial court.' The
rule seeks to discourage strike suits by removing the potential for illegitimate gain from a
coerced settlement. -- ' Settlements of derivative suits are still permitted, but only at the
discretion of the court which must act to safeguard the interests of shareholders not
involved in the suit. 222 The proponents of the settlement bear the burden of showing that
"' Meritless suits can be expensive in time as well as money, distracting the board and manage-
ment from the day-to-day operations of the corporation. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
2 ' 2 See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 787 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Handek, The
Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions — Partrt!, 22 Sw. L. J. 767, 768.70 (1968); Chicago Note,
supra note 16, at 172; HENN, supra note 18, at 749. The potential for private settlement is especially
attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys who may be able to receive an inflated fee as part of the settlement in
exchange for agreeing to a negligible recovery for the corporation. See W. CARY 8c M. EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS 979-81 (5th ed. 1980); Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 941 (1965).
2" See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 153-73.
213 FED. R. Cot. P. 23.1. See infra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.
217 FED. R. Cot. P. I I. See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
2 " 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). See infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
223 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 reads, in pertinent part: "The action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs." This part of FED. R. Civ. P.
23.1 has also been adopted in many states. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963);
DEL. CODE ANN., CH. CT. R. 23.1 (1981).
" 1 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Carp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966). In Surowitz the United States
Supreme Court, in deciding a motion brought under Rule 23(b), the predecessor of Rule 23.1,
stated:
[The settlement restriction] was originally adopted and has served since in part as a
means to discourage "strike suits" by people who might be interested in getting quick
dollars by making charges without regard to their truth so as to coerce corporate
managers to settle worthless claims in order to get rid of them.
Id.
222 Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming approval of settlement);
United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers National Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647, 655-57 (7th Cir.
1971) (affirming approval); Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1970) (affirming disapproval).
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it is in the best interests of all the affected parties, 223
 but the settlement hearing is not
intended to become a trial on the merits."' Nevertheless the court must allow persons
objecting to the settlement to have a meaningful participation in the hearing, including
the right to discourage, to cross-examine, and to develop a record."" Once all parties have
been heard, the court decides whether- the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate."""" The court considers several factors, including the probability of success of the
claim and the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation."' Even if the court
approves the settlements, objectors, though not parties to the litigation, may appeal the
decision.'"
A principled application of this process would deter strike suit plaintiffs by halting
settlements of meritless claims. Plaintiffs and attorneys with unfounded claims would not
expend the time and money on a suit that had no hope of success at trial and no hope of
producing an extortionate settlement. By removing the reward for bringing strike suits
the rule removes the danger that they will be brought against a corporation.'" Accord-
ingly, the demand requirement is obsolete in its corporate defense function. Moreover,
the corporation is further defended by other procedural restraints on frivolous litigation.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempts to check frivolous legal
maneuvering by assigning responsibility for the content of a legal filing to the party or
attorney who offers it.'" The rule requires an attorney to sign "every pleading, motion
and other paper" that he presents to the court in the course of a litigation. The signature
of the attorney is construed as his representation of his belief, formed after reasonable
inquiry, that the filing is well grounded in fact and law and is not introduced to harass the
opponent, delay the proceedings or needlessly increase the cost of the litigation. The rule
thus imposes an affirmative duty on the attorney to investigate the law or facts contained
2" Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974).
224
 Id. at 381; United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumer National Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647,
657 (7th Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Newman, 59 F.R.D. 525, 527 (S.D.N. V. 1973).
255 Girsch v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975).
226
 Lewis v. Newman, 59 F.R.D. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
314 F. Supp. 710, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968). See City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) (setting out eight factors to be considered).
228
 3B J. MooRE & J. KENNEDY, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.24[3] (1984).
'9
 One commentator argues, however, that strike suits are better controlled by ethical canons
and rules against solicitation. See Note, Verification as a Safeguard Against Abuse of Stockholders' Deriva-
tive Suits, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1966).
23°
 FED. R. Cry. P. 11 states, in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. ay. P. 11.
The 1983 amendment to the rule expressly increased the scope of the rule from covering only
"pleadings" to covering "every pleading, motion and other paper." In addition, the 1983 amendment
introduced the duty of reasonable inquiry, the representation that the filing is not frivolous, and
certain sanctions that are discussed infra text accompanying notes 233-34.
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in the filing."'` The rule is also obviously aimed at the kind of unjustified, harassing
pleadings that concern the courts when dealing with the demand requirement for deriva-
tive actions.''" Sanctions are imposed for failure to comply with Rule 11. 233 An unsigned
filing will be stricken unless the party or attorney promptly signs it after due notice. A
party or attorney who signs a filing that violates the rule faces stiffer penalties and may be
required to compensate the opposing party for the costs, including attorney fees, in-
curred because of the filing. 23'
Although the effectiveness of Rule 11 in preventing frivolous pleadings has been
criticised in the past, 235 it certainly has the potential to become a powerful tool in
combatting meritless pleadings. The recent amendments, moreover, may serve to rejuve-
nate the rule and increase both its use and usefulness.'3
 In the derivative action context, a
vigorous Rule 11, by punishing the filing of frivolous claims, would seriously deter
shareholder-plaintiffs and their attorneys from initiating strike suits. Yet because Rule I 1
does not put the fate of the litigation in the hands of the board of directors as the demand
requirement does, it does not threaten good faith derivative suits. Thus Rule 11 can
provide protection from strike suits for the corporation without creating a barrier against
shareholder-plaintiffs who have meritorious claims.
Another federal procedural protection against frivolous litigation is 28 U.S.C. §
1927. 37 This section allows a court to impose opposing party's costs, including attorney
'31 See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431, 432 (D. Mass 1983). In Anderson, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants had contaminated the water supply in Woburn, Massachusetts. The court
held that plaintiff's counsel could have properly relied on a report prepared by the EPA and the
opinion of an environmental engineer brought in as a consultant in preparing the complaint. Id.
This duty to investigate was recognized under the rule prior to the 1983 amendments. See
Rhinehart v. Stouffer, 638 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979) (implying a duty to investigate from Rule
11).
25' See Galef v. Alexander, 625 F.2d 51, 66 n.24 (1980) ("We recognize the possibility that
stockholders may assert meritless ... claims . (Nut this risk should be lessened by FED. R. Crv. P.
11.").
FED. R. Ctv. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant if a ,
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
53' Although the rule purports to mandate specific sanctions when the signed filing violates the
rule, the court has broad discretion in imposing sanctions. See Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co.,
717 F.2d 1160, 1166.67 (7th Cir. 1983).
"5 Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV, I (1976). Professor Risinger cites the difficulty of articulating a
standard to judge the movant's knowledge and belief, id. at 9; the problems of enforcement, id. at
114-17; and the hesitancy of courts to make use of the rule, id. at 34-37.
1"
 To give the rule more vitality was the purpose of the 1983 amendments. See Advisory
Committee's Note to 1983 Amendments of FED. R. Cry. P. 11. The Advisory Committee Note states,
"[t]tre new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions by emphasiz-
ing the responsibilities of the attorney and reinforcing those obligations by the imposition of
sanctions." Id. (citations omitted).
"' The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as amended, is as follows:
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fees, on an attorney who "unreasonably and vexatiously" "multiplies the proceedings" in a
lawsuit."38
 Note that section 1927 places its sanction on the responsible attorney, not the
litigant for whom the attorney is acting." 3° The "costs" imposed include any reasonable
excess costs incurred by the attorney's misconduct. As such, section 1927 provides a
strong disincentive to an attorney tempted to file a derivative strike suit. Any potential for
gain from a quick settlement is negated by the possibility of being held personally liable
for his opponent's costs."°
States have also erected defenses for corporations against strike suits. In addition to
enacting procedural rules on the model of Rule 23.1, some states require a shareholder-
plaintiff to give security for expenses as a condition to the continued maintenance of an
action."' The policy behind these statutes is to dissuade potential strike plaintiffs from
bringing suit by forcing them to commit assets which might later be lost if the suit is found
to be frivolous."" Although these statutes have been criticised for failing to distinguish
between meritorious and unmeritorious actions,"i 3
 they nevertheless present another
obstacle to the strike suit plaintiff and his attorney.
In light of the variety of procedural safeguards available, the concern.of the majority
position favoring retention of the demand requirement for derivative suits is unfounded.
Adequate protection for the corporate defendant exists in both the federal and state
forum. 'This protection is, moreover, less intrusive on the rights of good faith
shareholder-plaintiffs than the demand requirement when the directors approved of or
acquiesced in the wrong and are thus hostile to the suit. In derivative suits involving board
approval the courts should waive the demand requirement and rely on the procedural
devices outlined in this note to weed out strike suits.
CONCLUSION
Courts have not generally waived the demand requirement for a shareholder-
plaintiff who alleges that demand would be futile because the board of directors had
approved or acquiesced to the conduct that is challenged in the derivative suit. The
rationale for requiring demand is tripartite: first, that Rule 23.1 is an "extraordinary rule"
which mandates that the futility of demand be plead with unusual specificity; second, that
the board of director's approval or acquiescence is not sufficient for a court to presume
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceeding's in any case unrea-
sonably and vexatiously may he required by the court to satisfy the excess costs,
expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)
238 Id, Section 2 of the Antitrust Procedural Improvement Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3,
94 Stat. 1 156 (1980)) amended section 1927 to include attorney fees explicitly among the costs for
which an attorney who institutes frivolous proceeding may he personally liable.
239 See Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, 556 F. Supp. 484 (C.D. Ill. 1983); McKirdy,28 U.S.C. 1927 —
Counselor Beware, 71 ILL. B. J. 708, 709 (1983).
' Although the section has not been applied to derivative suits, there is nothing in the language
or case law of section 1927 that would prevent its application in this context.
"' N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-6 (West 1969); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 433 (Purdon 1967).
24' See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and A Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM L. REV. 261, 314 (1981).
" Id. This criticism is true insofar as both good faith and frivolous plaintiffs may be required to
post security. Ideally, however, only the frivolous plaintiff would lose the security permanently.
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that the board will treat the plaintiff's demand with bad faith; and third, that demand is a
necessary means of protecting the corporations from strike suits. Yet other courts have
asserted that Rule 23.1 is not "extraordinary" and should not be read in a way that
burdens unfairly plaintiffs who may have limited access to relevant information. Addi-
tionally, studies of corporate hoards reveal that a board of directors, having approved or
acquiesced to the challenged action, would probably not give proper consideration to a
shareholder's demand to bring suit. Finally, procedural rules of both state and federal
courts provide adequate protection for the corporation against meritless claims.
If the board of directors is prejudiced against a shareholder suit then the demand
requirement, combined with the judicial deference afforded by the business judgment
rule, serves as a means of terminating valid derivative actions along with frivolous ones.
Unless demand is essential to guard the corporation from strike suits, it should be waived
when the board is likely to be hostile to the shareholder suit. When the board has
approved or acquiesced to the alleged corporate wrong, it probably will act to terminate
the suit even if the suit has merit. Because of the protection from strike suits provided to
the corporation by other procedural devices, the Rule 23.1 restrictions on settlements, the
sanctions of Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and state strike suit defenses, the demand
requirement can be dispensed with safely in these situations. Therefore, to prevent unfair
termination of shareholder suits, and consequently, to maintain the valuable check that
such suits impose on corporate actions, courts should waive the demand requirement
when the board of directors has approved or acquiesced to the conduct challenged by the
derivative plaintiff.
DAVID P. CURTIN
